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I dislike second-guessing the manager. I really do. Usually, I can understand his reasoning even if I don't necessarily agree with it. I can figure out what he's probably thinking. I'm also aware that he knows lots and lots of stuff that I don't know.
 - Me, while ripping John Gibbons a brand new orifice for a decision I didn't like a whole lot.

I blithely mentioned the other day that it made sense to expect the New Boss to run a ball game more or less in the same fashion as the guy he's been sitting next to on the Red Sox bench these past few years. Reasonable, no? But I then began to wonder - exactly how does Terry Francona run a ball game? How does it differ from what Joe Maddon would do? (I realize Tampa fans are wondering why anyone would be interested, as they firmly believe Clueless Joe is the only reason they haven't won the WS yet, but I'm not so sure... )

I've always said that Game management accounts for a rather small part of the manager's actual job - the thing is, it accounts for almost all of the job that is visible to us. And we're stuck with that. And while way, way too much is always made about any one particular game decision, if it's possible to uncover some larger patterns... maybe it'll be worth knowing.  We never have much context for how a manager operates.  What does one team actually do differently than another team? Sometimes we can actually find out.

It's always useful to remind ourselves that there is no right or wrong way to do these things. For example - most managers very much prefer to use a set lineup.  And while it's possible that I was simply traumatized by watching Jimy Williams work here for three plus seasons,  I certainly understand that kind of thinking.  I have some sympathy for this view.  I'm not sure players play their best when they're being juggled and moved around. Nevertheless.... only two managers have seven World Series titles and one of them is Casey Stengel, who was only the maddest juggler of ballplayers who ever lived. And who's right behind Casey? Joe Torre, a man cut from the exact same cloth as Casey. Granted, Stengel and Torre both spent the first few decades of their managerial careers wandering from town to town, losing wherever they went. But it's obvious (it's certainly obvious now!)  that their approach could work, that you could win doing things that way, and you could win pretty big... 

So I don't want to imply that one way is better than another. I'm just rooting through the numbers, I'm just looking for something bright and shiny that I didn't already know.

Let's begin with something about pitching. Is Terry Francona - or Joe Girardi, or Ron Gardenhire, or whoever - quick to pull his starter?  Or does he have a slower hook? Let's find out. We will use Bill James' updated definition of the terms Slow Hook and Quick Hook (which he probably invented anyway, back in the day.) Here's what you do.

Pull out your database with every start in the American League in 2010. Everybody's got one, right?

Assign 1 point for every pitch thrown by the starting pitcher.
Assign 10 points for every run allowed by the starting pitcher.

You now have a Score for every game in the league. The 25% of games with the lowest scores are the Quick Hooks, the 25% of games with the highest scores are the Slow Hooks. These are very broad categories, obviously - we've got roughly 565 Quick Hooks, as opposed to about 1130 Normal Hooks and about 565 Slow Hooks. So naturally, the average for each team would be about 41 Quick, 41 Slow and about 80 that were Neither.

For example, on April 30, Brandon Morrow threw 109 pitches and allowed 2 ER - that scores at 129. As it happens, 129 is about as close to being in the middle of these 2000 or so games as you can get.  In 2010, any game that comes in at 114 or less will be a Quick Hook; any game that comes in at 143 or higher will be a Slow Hook.

The extremes - well, you can imagine what they're like. The Quickest Hook of all was Ozzie Guillen pulling Gavin Floyd after 7 pitches last September - Floyd's shoulder tightened up. And the Slowest Hook of all was Mike Scioscia leaving Scott Kazmir in to allow 13 runs while throwing 103 pitches over 5 innings last July.

It may be helpful to see a couple of games near the margins. While every manager is very well represented in all three categories, I'll provide examples from the 2010 Jays because I figure there's a fighting chance you might remember the actual game. The quickest Toronto hook of all was actually June 1, when Brian Tallet was pulled after 5.2 shutout innings, 82 pitches. Some others:

Sep 22 - Kyle Drabek, 5 IP, 3 ER, 84 pitches. It scores 114 and it's (barely) a Quick Hook. But so is...
Aug 1 - Jesse Litsch, 4 IP, 4 ER, 74 pitches. Also 114. As is...
Jun 11 - Ricky Romero, 5 IP, 4 ER, 74 pitches.

And some Slow Hooks from the 2010 Jays:

April 16 - Shaun Marcum, 7 IP, 4 ER, 105 pitches (scores 145)
June 29 - Brandon Morrow, 6 IP, 5 ER, 96 pitches (scores 146)
May 9 - Ricky Romero, 5.1 IP, 4 ER, 110 pitches (scores 150)

The slowest Toronto hook was August 11, when Shaun Marcum went 4 IP, threw 92 pitches, and allowed 8 ER. Score of 172.

Now these games, and games like them, may not seem like Slow Hooks or Quick Hooks to you, or to me for that matter. Here's what they are: 

In the context of how AL managers were actually running their pitching staffs in 2010, games like these really do represent Quicker and Slower Hooks than what is currently generally accepted Standard Operating Procedure.

Now that was a mouthful of something, no?

A final question of method - what about the Complete Games? How can it be a Hook at all, when the hook never came? Well, obviously the hook could have come, and indeed if the hook had come for Gil Meche last May 8, after 128 pitches and 3 ER (score of 158) it would have been a Slow Hook. So why not count it? It does mean that on the other end, we really do have a couple of complete games that actually qualify as Quick Hooks - Braden's perfect game, Galarraga's imperfect game, Marcum's game against Oakland. Lumping them in with the Quick Hooks is obviously kind of silly but in a data set of more than 2200 games, I'll live with a dozen anomalies. What the hell... But the presence of these games, as well as games when the manager was obliged to quickly pull a starting pitcher whose arm wasn't feeling good that day, probably does give each manager an extra Quick Hook or two...

And now, at last.. .you know you want it.... ZE DATA TABLE !!!

 	                       Quick 
MGR Games Hooks Pct.
Showalter BAL-3 57 21 .368
Geren OAK 162 54 .333
Gardenhire MIN 162 51 .315
Brown SEA-2 50 15 .300
Wakamatsu SEA-1 112 32 .286
Gaston TOR 162 45 .278
Washington TEX 162 43 .265
Girardi NYY 162 42 .259
Hillman KCR-1 35 9 .257
Scioscia LAA 162 41 .253
Acta CLE 162 39 .241
Maddon TBR 162 39 .241
Guillen CWS 162 38 .235
Samuel BAL-2 51 10 .196
Francona BOS 162 30 .185
Leyland DET 162 29 .179
Yost KCR-2 127 20 .157
Trembley BAL-1 54 5 .093
The league average, by definition, is 25% - so Mike Scioscia (just barely) and everyone above him, has more Quick Hooks than the average.

The teams and managers really committed to the Quicker Hook were Oakland, Minnesota, and Seattle. And the most interesting, to me anyway, is Seattle. To find out why I think that, you'll have to wait until I get around to doing something similar about how everyone was running their bullpens. As for the other Quick Hooks - Cito Gaston in Toronto was managing a very raw pitching staff (only Ricky Romero had ever thrown enough innings in a season to even qualify for the ERA title) and Ron Washington was managing in Texas, where the baseballs fly out of the yard and the heat grinds you down. So I don't think there's much to see there.

Now the Slower Hooks.... let's just re-sort the numbers

                        Slow  
MGR Games Hooks    Pct.
Francona    BOS    162    61    .377
Hillman    KCR-1   35    13    .371
Scioscia    LAA    162    52    .321
Samuel    BAL-2   51    16    .314
Guillen    CWS    162    49    .302
Leyland    DET    162    49    .302
Acta    CLE    162    48    .296
Yost    KCR-2  127    36    .283
Washington  TEX    162    40    .247
Trembley    BAL-1   54    13    .241
Girardi    NYY    162    35    .216
Gaston    TOR    162    31    .191
Maddon    TBR    162    31    .191
Wakamatsu   SEA-1  112    21    .188
Geren    OAK    162    29    .179
Gardenhire  MIN    162    26    .160
Brown    SEA-2   50     8    .160
Showalter   BAL-3   57     6    .105
Everyone from Ned Yost on up has more Slow Hooks than the 25% average and Terry Francona, by a comfortable mile, leads the pack. With John Farrell sitting by his side, of course. Not that this really tells us how Farrell will handle the group of starters he has in Toronto. In Boston Francona was working with a veteran staff for the most part - Lackey, Becket, Matsuzaka, even Lester I suppose. Buchholz being the obvious exception.

Francona and Mike Scioscia are both veteran managers, and many veteran managers have tended to go longer with the starters. Jim Leyland is also among the managers more likely to have a Slower Hooks, and I suspect Leyland would rank much higher here if he wasn't watching out for Porcello (and maybe Scherzer as well.) But on the other hand... Ron Gardenhire's been doing this for a while and he's got one of the Fastest Hooks around...

Finally, let's sort them one more time - this time by most games that are neither Slow nor Quick. By now of course we've identified almost every manager as tending in one direction or the other. With a couple of prominent exceptions...

MGR                Games  Neither Q/S    Pct.    

Trembley    BAL-1    54    36    0.667   
Maddon    TBR    162    92    0.568   
Yost    KCR-2  127    71    0.559    Slow
Brown    SEA-2   50    27    0.540    Quick
Gaston    TOR    162    86    0.531    Quick
Wakamatsu    SEA-1  112    59    0.527    Quick
Showalter    BAL-3    57    30    0.526    Quick
Gardenhire   MIN    162    85    0.525    Quick
Girardi    NYY     162    85    0.525    Quick
Leyland    DET     162    84    0.519    Slow
Samuel    BAL-2    51    25    0.490    Slow
Geren    OAK    162    79    0.488    Quick
Washington   TEX    162    79    0.488    Quick
Acta    CLE     162    75    0.463    Slow
Guillen    CWS     162    75    0.463    Slow
Francona    BOS     162    71    0.438    Slow
Scioscia    LAA     162    69    0.426    Slow/Quick
Hillman    KCR-1    35    13    0.371    Slow/Quick

Ladies and gentlemen, let me commend to your attention the fascinating cases of Joe Maddon and Mike Scoscia.

Maddon has both fewer Quicker Hooks and fewer Slower Hooks - he actually defines the conventional wisdom! The conventional wisdom is what Joe Maddon does!  (For now - wait til we get to the bullpen!).  Ned Yost, with his Slower hook and Cito Gaston with his Quicker one are pretty conventional as well.

But at the other extreme - Mike Scioscia has far more Slower Hooks than the league average - but he also has more Quick Hooks than the League Average. He defies the conventional wisdom, whatever it is. Well, him and Trey Hillman. Which didn't work out so well in Kansas City, but I doubt this was why.

Did I mention that there is no right or wrong way to do these things? (Repeatedly, I'm sure.) There's only whatever works for you, whatever you can win with. The work of Francona and Gardenhire and Maddon and Scioscia sure looks like an argument over the best way to do these things, because they certainly don't seem to agree with one another. But it really is possible to win every which way. (Does anyone really want to say one of them's right and one of them's wrong? That Francona's hook is too slow, that Gardenhire's is too fast, that Maddon is too conventional, that Scioscia is too unconventional?) Let's remember that most of the managers working in the AL last season have been able to win doing things whichever way they happen to do them. Six of them (Francona, Gaston, Girardi, Leyland, Guillen, Scioscia) have managed WS winners - four more managed teams into the post-season (Showalter, Maddon, Gardenhire, Washington)

And Ned Yost came really, really close.


AL Managers and The Hook | 9 comments | Create New Account
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Mike Green - Tuesday, February 08 2011 @ 01:52 PM EST (#230052) #
My interest is not so much in managerial differences, but in the influence of context and roster decisions on managerial choices.  The seven-man bullpen with considerable financial resources being devoted is one factor.  The other interesting factor is the decline in runners on base (and resultant reduction in stress per inning on starters).  The combination of these two factors result in an offensive context that is consistent with the late 80s/early 90s, but with more pitchers needing work in the pen.  So, for instance in 1988, the Red Sox had four relievers who made over 20 appearances.  The ace Lee Smith threw about 1.25 innings/appearance.  Stanley and Lamp threw almost 2 innings per appearance, and the left-handed specialist Tom Bolton threw just over an inning per.  Even LaRussa's A's had just five regular relievers who got work and he got 400 innings out of them. 

It is pretty much impossible for a manager now to use a pen in this way when you've got six or seven arms out there needing regular work.



Mylegacy - Wednesday, February 09 2011 @ 01:17 AM EST (#230065) #
Magpie - this sh*t gives me a headache.

Take Gregg - he made his living with the Jays on the outside corners where he painted with a little white brush very pretty pictures. However - his paintings had to be precise or suddenly bad things would happen. Bad things like walks and hits. When he pitched I could "feel" I was - or was not - confident in how he was going. AND - I would get him out of the game - or more realistically scream at the TV for Cito to get him out of the game - before the four horseman on their trusty steads blew him away.

With Roy Halladay - I mostly was more relaxed. When he got in trouble I'd sit back and in my mind walk out to see him - ask him where he thought we should go for dinner after the game - then pat him on the back - tell him, "I'm getting hungry Roy go finish these bastards off." and walk back to the dugout.

Bottom line to me - quick pick - slow pick - it comes down to the pitchers and the Managers trust in them as individuals. I think a "Fast" trigger guy on a poor pitching team might just be a "Slow" trigger guy on a team with studs. I think you can document what Managers have done - but that only tells a small part of the story - the bigger part of the story is how much confidence the Manager had in the individual pitcher out there and what confidence he had in the guy warming up in the pen.

I think I'll have a scotch.

bpoz - Wednesday, February 09 2011 @ 10:56 AM EST (#230073) #
You did a lot of work Magpie. Your topics often are quite intellectual. Thanks.

Now I am sure a lot on this has gone over my head but anyhow let me try to extract something from your ideas.

So this data is only for the 2010 season. But in theory & in general does the following make sense.
Mylegacy mentioned Halladay, so with Halladay on his staff would any manager's Hook slow down. What about Tallet whom I would define as a veteran, not used to starting and a #4/5 SP.
I know our new bullpen coach P Hentgen had a lot of complete games, his CGs would have a higher score than Halladay I think because his pitch count & ERs contribution was higher.

I would like peoples thoughts about this regarding young developing pitchers. For example K Drabek, lets say he stays in for 105-115 pitches unless he is throwing a No Hitter. What about his confidence & learning to deal with difficulty. Quick or Slow Hook? Also Zep, he throws a lot of pitches and probably should throw more strikes, but I don't know. He should get into the 7th inning more often. His arm would get affected by throwing a lot of pitches, and still getting good results, but leaving in the 6th or 7th inning. He is forcing a quick hook, right?

I wonder how our young 2011 staff stacks up.

Gerry - Wednesday, February 09 2011 @ 11:17 AM EST (#230076) #

How do we factor in experience of the starting pitchers and quality of performance?  You mention how Terry Francona had some very experienced starters and two young studs, Lester and Bucholz.  Oakland had very young pitchers, Seattle had a bad team.  You would expect young starting staffs and bad teams to have the quickest hooks.  Mike Scioscia also had an experienced starting staff.

Seeing Ron Gardenhire on the quick hook list was the biggest surprise to me.  Minnesota were a playoff team and you would have thought a quick hook was not required.

Mick Doherty - Wednesday, February 09 2011 @ 02:47 PM EST (#230086) #

a playoff team and you would have thought a quick hook was not required.

Gerry, let us not forget arguably the geatest team of our lifetimes, the 1975-76 Reds, were managed by Sparky Anderson, AKA "Captain Hook."

Magpie - Wednesday, February 09 2011 @ 03:35 PM EST (#230089) #
Seattle had a bad team.

Yes, but they didn't have particularly bad pitching - they had the ballpark working for them, and of course they also had the best pitcher in the whole damn league.
Smithers - Wednesday, February 09 2011 @ 10:38 PM EST (#230111) #
First off - nice investigative report here Magpie, really appreciate them in the long winter months leading up to spring training ( which is so very close now...).

Also, I don't know if we can read much into how Terry Francona's influence will affect John Farrell in his quick or slow hooks.  As you mentioned, Joe Maddon and Mike Scioscia are the definitive outliers in the trends.  Maddon served under Scioscia for many years and won a title together with the Angels in 2002, and both were catchers as players.  You would expect a closer link between those mangers based upon the shared background but that wasn't the case in the least, although by reports they play a similar aggressive style of play based on pitching and defence.  As Farrell is one of the rarest types of managers as a former pitcher, he should develop a pretty good read on his new horses and how many pitches they have in them on a given night.  I always thought that Cito Gaston would pull Shaun Marcum before his time during games - maybe he just knew that Marcum wasn't quite the workhorse of some of the other young guys.

Perhaps the makeup of the pitching staff (veteran or inexperienced) has a greater affect on the hooks?  It would be interesting to exam these statistics over multiple years to see whether the percentages are consistent from manager to manager or vary like BABIP.
MatO - Thursday, February 10 2011 @ 09:29 AM EST (#230120) #
Seattle should have been quick hooking their hitters.
Mike Green - Thursday, February 10 2011 @ 10:21 AM EST (#230123) #
Well, that kind of leads up to my point at the outset.  Seattle starts out the year with Hernandez and Lee at the top of the rotation and a fabulous defence, Wilson and Figgins at short and second, Gutierrez and Ichiro! in the outfield, and a seven man pen.  They've got a couple of players who could make useful offensive contributions, but you really cannot rely on.  Milton Bradley in left-field being the poster-boy for that.  Jose Lopez would probably also fit in the category comfortably. 

What you really want to do is get 3 serviceable starters behind Hernandez and Lee, have a 5 man pen, and have a series of platoon/pinch-hitting possibilities.  So, for instance, Bradley has always (unlike most switch-hitters) hit better against lefties, and that pattern continued in 2011.  If you had a decent left-handed bat who could play left-field, you would have choices when Bradley struggled mightily coming out of the gate.  They eventually acquired Branyan in late June, but by that point, they were already 14 games out and they needed 3 of him rather than 1. 

AL Managers and The Hook | 9 comments | Create New Account
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