These are how many innings pitched each of the Jays starters averaged in 2012 per start:
R.A. Dickey - 7.1
Brandon Morrow - 5.9
Mark Buehrle - 6.5
Josh Johnson - 6.2
JA Happ - 5.6
This pace would require the bullpen to pitch 13.7 innings every five games (assuming an even 9 innings a game). Even acknowledging that there be small stretches where the bullpen may be taxed pretty heavily because of a few bad starts in a row, I don't see why a six man bullpen couldn't handle that workload, especially when you add off days.
The Jays have 3 of the top 43 pitchers in the MLB in 2012 in terms of innings pitched. The 2012 Jays had none. If you want to tell me that the 2012 Jays would have really suffered trying to carry a six-man bullpen to the point where it wouldn't really have been feasible, I won't argue. But until it has been proven not to work, I don't see anything here to suggest the 2013 Jays need 7 relievers, let alone 8.
This is different from the well-reasoned criticism of Gibbons' managerial moves during this game that Charlie made and others, including myself, noted earlier. Given the players available to him tonight, I believe Gibbons absolutely made the wrong call in today's game and gained a small advantage for a larger disadvantage later and eliminated the possibility of deploying Davis more usefully later.
"Johnson or Buehrle gets knocked out of the game in the 3rd or 4th inning, the bullpen gets burned up, relievers heroically offer to pitch for 2 or 3 innings, and key pitchers end up following Santos onto the DL list. (Yes, I know that Loup and Rogers have done multi-inning stints this year, and it can be done again, but I also know that the Jays bullpen has pitched more innings than any other team in the division this season, and we can't assume that they can just blithely continue at that pace without consequences, especially so early in the year.)"
Before yesterday's game, Aaron Loup and Esmil Rogers had combined to pitch to six batters over the previous three games. In none of those three games did the team's eighth reliever pitch. In the event of Johnson having been knocked out early last night, I am going to assume that they could have completed a multi-inning stretch that shouldn't be characterized as heroic and that they would likely have suffered no greater chance of injury as a result that the inherent risk of injury present every time a pitcher takes the mound. (At least as far as can be discerned by an outside observer, I'm open to hearing evidence that counters this point, but relievers like Luis Perez and Sergio Santos weren't being overworked before suffering serious arm injuries.)
I don't think fans are turning on Farrell. Many of us still think he's a good manager. That doesn't mean he's infallible or that a reasonable consideration of the game and options at his disposal doesn't suggest that the Jays would likely have had a better chance of winning the game if he hadn't managed the game the way he did.
"And pitchers often try to stay in games, or volunteer for more innings, when they shouldn't. That's reckless heroism."
If Santos is unavailable because he was complaining of arm trouble, as he may have been immediately prior to his DL stint, you don't pitch him. It's not complicated. It's entirely on Gibbons if he calls upon Santos to throw 2 or 3 innings, given the pitcher's injury last year and upon him complaining of arm troubles.
If Santos has never alerted Gibbons to his injury, that's on Santos. It may be understandable, but there's an onus on the player to alert management to a potential injury. A manager can't manage a bullpen on the assumption that relievers are hiding soreness and potential injuries.
And as per the Frasor example, nobody is suggesting Bauxites are omniscient. If Aaron Loup and Esmil Rogers go on the DL tomorrow with arm injuries, I will probably withdraw these criticisms (although I will likely have new questions as to why AA tried to survive several days with two potentially injured pitchers in the bullpen). However, I'm not going to refrain from commenting on roster and in-game management decisions on the assumption that every move the front office and coaching staff is optimal.
