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According to the ever-interesting Peter Gammons, the Los Angeles Dodgers have hired Paul DePodesta to be their new General Manager. While Pete's rumour mill is usually about as reliable as the Weekly World News, he rarely gets a news story wrong, so the hiring seems like a go. This opens up any number of interesting points.

The first, of course, is the defection of one more member of Billy Beane's once-mighty front-office team in Oakland. With JP Ricciardi, Grady Fuson and Paul DePodesta surrounding Beane, the late-90s A's were a GM factory waiting to happen (my money's on Fuson to replace John Hart after he's put down in Texas). That's a lot of talent to walk out the door. Gitz would be in a better position than I to reflect on what this latest loss means to the brainpower in Oakland; but as the A's are starting to show on the field, you can only lose so much talent before things start breaking down. DePodesta is unquestionably bright, talented and hard-working, and losing a guy like that can't be good for Oakland's hopes to continue its remarkable run of low-budget success.

Second, we're about to see the so-called "Oakland Model" (more on this later) transplanted to the National League for the first time (though there's an argument that Kevin Towers has already partly adopted this approach in San Diego). The Dodgers were once the vanguard of innovation in baseball (think Branch Rickey), but over the last 25 years, they've come full circle and for many people now represent outdated, complacent, Establishment-type thinking. DePodesta could change all that -- if he's given the authority that Ricciardi received in Toronto. The parallels between the two situations are remarkable, actually: moribund organizations recently bought by new ownership that doesn't intend to spend a lot of money on the team. Don't be surprised if the Dodgers somehow morph into a "small-market" team over the next few years. But also keep an eye on how the "Oakland Model" evolves in a league with no DH, in one of the most extreme pitchers' parks of the last 50 years, with no league competitors operating on that system. More on this later, too.

Third, there are some who'll see DePodesta's hiring as a sabrmetric watershed -- "Beaneball" finally adopted by a major, storied franchise. This argument would have to ignore the Yankees and Red Sox, whose internal philosophies don't differ greatly from those in Oakland and Toronto, but there is a distinction worth drawing: those teams' leaders aren't tied explicitly to the Oakland front office, the way Toronto's is and LA's is about to become -- and throughout baseball, there is no middle ground about the "Oakland Model." Either you like it, or you really, really don't. DePodesta is going to become the new lightning rod for traditional baseball's skepticism (and hostility) towards the "Oakland Model," in a way that Ricciardi, who moved to some backwater north of the border, never was. The Model is about to get its first big tryout in a major media market, and don't doubt that there is a lot riding on that.

And fourth and finally, it's time we looked closely at what this philosophy is and what we're going to call it. Many people still refer to it as the "Oakland Model," designating Toronto as "Oakland North" and LA, one presumes, soon to become "Oakland South." Others call it the "Sabrmetric Model," or as referenced earlier, "Beaneball." The problem, I think, is that none of these names really fits.

For all the talk about the deep ties and numerous transactions between the A's and Blue Jays, I'm convinced that JP's organizational philosophy is not identical to Billy Beane's. The 2004 Blue Jays will not resemble, as far as I can tell, any of the great Oakland teams of the last few years. Starting pitching is a concern, not a strength -- ditto the left side of the infield -- and their drafts seem different (I can't shake the feeling that JP wouldn't have taken Jeremy Brown with a first-round pick). The "Toronto Model" owes its antecedents to the "Oakland Model," to be sure; but it's still a distinct and unique corporate direction and philosophy, one that we haven't yet seen unfolded all the way. It's an oversimplification to call it Oakland North; it is what it is, and so far it looks pretty good. I expect the same thing to happen in LA -- I very much doubt that DePodesta is going to simply recreate the A's approach in Chavez Ravine. Smart folks like Ricciardi, DePodesta and Fuson, much as they obviously agree with Beane on many things, have their own ideas and variations on the theme, and they're going to implement them.

It isn't even fair to call this "Sabrmetric Ball" -- not least because the overuse of SABR in statistical terms undermines and ignores that organization's remarkable work in the fields of baseball history and research. Statistics are tools, and every organization uses them to varying degrees. As DePodesta made clear in this speech, it's not about the stats per se, it's about the willingness to question conventional wisdom, to explore and adopt innovative approaches, and to demand evidence that a certain approach works before allowing it to remain in place. Within that willingness to innovate, to think creatively, to tear down existing structures and to take manageable risks, there is tremendous room for variation, and it's that variation we see in Oakland, Toronto and Boston and that we will now see in LA. I don't expect the Dodgers to start loading up on high-OBP sluggers the way Oakland tried, because I don't think that will work in a National League pitcher's park. But they will do things differently than they've been done before.

If I had to give this "model" a name, I'd call it the "Innovation Model." It's characterized by leaders who are courageous, creative and skeptical, questioning accepted beliefs and applying rigorous standards for performance. In this model, risks are encouraged if their proponents can establish a reasonable basis for their attempt; failures are not criticized but welcomed, in order to encourage more smart risks in future. Everything has a purpose that fits within the overall vision -- and everyone is fully, even passionately committed to the vision. It attracts some people like moths to a porchlight, though it repels others just as strongly -- it has its downsides, including a hothouse, oppressed-minority mentality that can be expressed in impatience and even contempt for divergent views. In the end, though, performance is what counts: "best efforts" are fine and dandy, but winning is the name of the game: the model aims for success and accepts nothing less.

That's the model that has been used in Oakland and Toronto -- arguably, also in Boston and New York -- and that's now coming to Los Angeles. When watching the new DePodesta regime, don't look for Oakland v. 2.0 -- look for the signs of the Innovation Model set out above. That's what distinguishes the new breed of front offices from the old school, just as Branch Rickey once left his competitors in the dust back in Brooklyn. Watch closely, and enjoy it: it's not every day you get to sit and watch a paradigm shifting.

The Innovation Model | 60 comments | Create New Account
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Mike Green - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 10:57 AM EST (#78943) #
Very interesting. Jordan, a high-OBP slugger is at least as valuable in LA than in an AL park. Long-sequence offences are harder to maintain in LA than elsewhere.

The Dodgers problems are easy to identify and easy to solve, compared with the situation that JP inherited. They simply did not get enough production out of particularly out of their 1B/LF slots last year. They have a loaded farm system, and the slots they have to fill are the easiest ones to fill cheaply.

With a good general manager (assuming dePodesta is hired), a fine manager, a loaded farm system, a lack of divisional competition and money, I expect the Dodgers to replace the Braves and be the dominant team in the National League over the next 10 years. If this happens, dePodesta would likely get the lion's share of the credit, but this would not be entirely deserved.
Gerry - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 10:59 AM EST (#78944) #
DePodesta in LA will be interesting. His arrival in LA is more like Theo Epstein's hiring than JP. DePodesta and Epstein never played professionally. A lot of JP's hires are guys who he played with in the minor leagues. Theo and DePodesta are young, and more "corporate" than "baseball". In Boston Theo is surrounded by career baseball guys, from Larry Luchino above to Mike Port and others below. Who will DePodesta find to work with? Who will he look to for his front office team? Baseball offices are not one man shows. How will the existing staff take to the new innovative approach? It might be rocky for a while in LA.

From a Blue Jay perspective one more team looking for innovative ways to operate might hinder Toronto's ability to be unique. If LA go the college route in the draft it will make for slimmer pickings for the other teams who favour college players such as Toronto. At some point the pendulum will swing back to high school players. I believe the 2004 draft is very strong in college pitching, so there might be no impact this year.

With more teams looking for innovative ways to do business, the issue is how much innovation is left. Oakland, Toronto, Boston etc. have found the "low hanging fruit". The next innovations will likely be harder to find, and less impactful to the team.

It will be interesting.
robertdudek - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 11:17 AM EST (#78945) #
Contest - predict when the next (first?) Dodgers-Red Sox World Series will take place.

Seriously though, I think that Epstein's regime is exactly the type DePodesta will institute in Los Angeles. The Dodgers free spending ways will come to a halt, but I don't think they're going to drop below median payroll.

Dodgers Stadium is a place where it's tough to get a hit, but homeruns are less affected than other types. I think they'll need 2 or 3 bona fide power hitters to build a good offence, knowing that it'll be relatively easy to construct a good pitching staff (as they had throughout the '70s). I also wonder how long Nomo and Ishii will be around - their high walk rates are exactly what you don't want in a park like that.

If this turns out to be on the level, I can't think of a more deserving person to get a GM job - congratulations and good luck to Mr. DePodesta.
Pistol - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 11:23 AM EST (#78946) #
If LA go the college route in the draft it will make for slimmer pickings for the other teams who favour college players such as Toronto.

I don't see this having much of an impact. It's just 1 team out of 30. Plus, as last year showed, there was a large shift to college players anyway.

If anything, given the strengths and weaknesses of both teams, LA & Toronto would make good trading partners which would, in theory, help the Jays.
robertdudek - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 11:25 AM EST (#78947) #
I think the defining characteristic of the Oakland-Toronto-Boston-LA approach is that it looks at every aspect of running a baseball organisation in a rational way.

You could call it Baseball Taylorism - a detailed study of every aspect of managing a baseball organisation, seeking to apply rational principles wherever possible.

OR, to follow a sports analogy, it could be likened to "Total Football" - a method of playing soccer that requires all the players to play in a completely coordinated way, across the entire pitch (this emerged in the '70s and is the de facto standard in Europe today).

I might call it Total Baseball Management.
_R Billie - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 11:56 AM EST (#78948) #
There is no doubt a lot of misconception around baseball about how these systems work. A couple of days ago I heard a couple of people including some from Baseball America talking on MLB Radio about how the Jays might not properly value Dustin McGowan just because he came from a high school background. Similarly there are no doubt some Dodgers fans out there wondering whether all of the Dodgers' top young pitching prospects, 95% drafted from high school or internationally, will be moved out for lesser players drafted from colleges.

Is DePodesta going to enter LA and dismantle the entire roster and throw out the pitching/defence strategy in favour of slow sluggers? Of course not. A huge portion of the A's success the last two years has been pitching/defence.

I think a bigger question will be the farm system and draft philosopy. LA has a lot more resources to put into scouting and signing amateur players than Oakland could probably hope for; since Dan Evans took over as GM the Dodgers under their current scouting director Logan White have enjoyed two tremendous drafts which have been high school heavy but have produced a lot of potential high end talent.

James Loney and Greg Miller were first rounders from the 2002 draft who look like potential stars, Miller being a power lefty who made AA and performed at the tender age of 19. And then Chad Billingsley in 2003. While uncertainty over their durability remains, if the idea of drafting college players is to move them quickly it's hard to think many college players would move any quicker than Miller and Billingsley have early in their careers.

Conversely, Oakland's 2002 draft had a lot of hype but has only Blanton turning in an obviously good performance. It's great that Jeremy Brown was a good story and all but taking him with a first round pick was quite simply an insanely stupid thing to do. They could have drafted him maybe 5 rounds or more later for a signing bonus less than $50K. What Oakland seemed to have forgotten in recent years is that they are not taking advantage of inefficiencies if they pay over market value for something.

I would be impressed if DePodesta viewed the recent success of the Dodgers farm system and let them do their thing for at least another year or two. They have the minor league resources and performance. That should be the last area of reform in the Dodgers organization if it needs reform at all. Paul's abilities are probably best used in finding a way to get rid of some salaries in bulk and replacing them with guys who will give the Dodgers some semblance of offensive performance. That would probably be enough to get the Dodgers into the playoffs.
_Matthew E - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 11:57 AM EST (#78949) #
I have taken to referring to the walks-and-homers type of offense as 'Weaverball'.
_coliver - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 12:24 PM EST (#78950) #
Congratulations to DePodesta. It makes one wonder, can Law be far behind???
Craig B - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 12:26 PM EST (#78951) #
They could have drafted him maybe 5 rounds or more later for a signing bonus less than $50K.

Huh? The A's gave Brown a $350,000 bonus, which is fourth-round money. It's a pretty rare 6th-rounder that signs for $50,000.
Craig B - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 12:29 PM EST (#78952) #
Congratulations to DePodesta. It makes one wonder, can Law be far behind???

I don't think Keith is close yet. The guy *I* worry about leaving is Tony LaCava, who is a Jays playoff appearance from being the Next Hot Assistant GM.
_R Billie - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 01:01 PM EST (#78953) #
Huh? The A's gave Brown a $350,000 bonus, which is fourth-round money. It's a pretty rare 6th-rounder that signs for $50,000.

Right but we're talking about a guy who was happy to get drafted at all. He agreed to far below market for a first round pick and likely would have done the same in the 6th or 7th round. Even if he signed for market value, the point remains that the supplemental first rounder could have been used on another player while still getting Brown later if not cheaper.

They cost themselves a first round quality asset which other teams would have perceived as such as well; at the very least said player would have been someone else with a good chance to help the team down the road or been useful as trade bait with a first rounder label.
_Ryan Day - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 01:13 PM EST (#78954) #
I always thought it was unfair that J.P. got lumped in with the "statheads" as though his sole credentials involved spreadsheets and numbers. The guy played pro ball and was a scout (the sort of people he apparently wants to do away with) for a long time before hooking up with Beane. So on that level alone, he's quite different from the DePodestas and Epsteins. Not necessarily better or worse, but he's far more of a "baseball man" than many people give him credit for.

As far as DePodesta goes, it's hard to predict what an assistant GM will do when he's promoted to GM. Maybe he's great at evaluation but lousy at negotiation; brilliant at acquisition but clueless at drafting. It's one thing to be a brilliant assistant GM, but entirely another to be the man at the top. It will be interesting to see how he approaches the 2004 draft, given the success of the Dodgers' high school picks; Ricciardi didn't seem to care about Rios, Quiroz and McGowan when making his picks, though.
robertdudek - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 01:21 PM EST (#78955) #
I think the main reason the drafted Brown that high is that they had TOO MANY high draft picks and didn't have the money to pay first round cash to all of them. As it is they spent over 7.5 million on their first 7 picks.
_Chuck Van Den C - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 03:20 PM EST (#78956) #
Contest - predict when the next (first?) Dodgers-Red Sox World Series will take place.

Contest - predict when the next Dodgers-A's trade will take place.

The biggest impact of the DePodesta signing to Blue Jays fans will be that Ricciardi may get scooped by DePodesta on trades with Beane. That said, Ricciardi now has another potential, reasonable trade partner.
_Dean - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 04:19 PM EST (#78957) #
I hope that more of the moneyball guys are gone from the draft board sooner so the Jays go to a more balanced draft. Not signing a single prep player is turning your back on too much of the talent pool. Time will tell if the Dodgers and Mariners had the right approach in the 2003 draft and although I think they took too many prep players their drafts have much greater upside. And yes they have more potential to bust as well - hence the balanced approach.
_R Billie - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 04:29 PM EST (#78958) #
One thing I've noticed with the Tim Wilken and Logan White drafts where they often take prep players early is that both guys have a very good track record in the first and supplemental first round. When they target their best prospects regardless of age they do very well early.

The Jays in the mean time don't have the top end talent but in the last two years have added many above average prospects through draft or trade which has had a dramatic effect on the depth of the system which already featured existing top end talent in McGowan, Rosario, Rios, and Quiroz. (And League and Perkins if they continue to develop).

Out of Hill, Adams, Bush, Banks, Griffin, Vermilyea, and Peterson the Jays may not have a single All-Star but all can be valuable parts of a good team. There is some advantage to playing for depth rather than ceiling for a mid-market team.
_NIck - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 04:35 PM EST (#78959) #
If you don't draft Brown there, then do you just throw away the pick? The point is, had they drafted a first round type, then the would have had to pay first round money. I'm quite sure the A's realize they could have gotten Brown in later rounds for less money, but they had to use the pick on someone, so you may as well use it on someone you consider a good player who, because he "was happy to get drafted at all", had already agreed to take far less than first round money despite being drafted in the first round. Had you been in the A's position, what would you have done?
_MikeJ - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 04:39 PM EST (#78960) #
"[M]y money's on Fuson to replace John Hart after he's put down in Texas"

It's already been announced that Fuson will take over in 2005.
_Dean - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 04:42 PM EST (#78961) #
I think you need depth and ceiling in a minor system. Case in point is the Twin's system. Impact prospects will fetch more in a trade & their upside may mean greater reurn on the field if retained. Depth is essential and should not be looked down upon but drafting only average players make for average teams.
_NIck - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 04:43 PM EST (#78962) #
It'll be interesting to see how Beane does now without DePodesta. Beane I'm quite sure isn't a stat/analysis guy, in the sense that he doesn't come up with the metrics/analysis, but sifts through what is presented to him and makes decisions based on these recommendations. His virtue is that he recognizes the value of what's presented to him from the stathead camp. So, who replaces DePodesta? Does Davenport or TangoTiger get a job? It's interesting that Law, whom I didn't consider one of the BP's true number crunchers, got the job with the Jays. Could someone like Huckabay have a shot? Actually, I'll wager it's probably someone who's already in the A's organization, an acolyte of DePodesta, who'll just be promoted. But that's just big 'ol unfounded speculation on my part.
_MikeJ - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 04:50 PM EST (#78963) #
"Actually, I'll wager it's probably someone who's already in the A's organization, an acolyte of DePodesta, who'll just be promoted"

Bingo!

http://www.oaklandtribune.com/Stories/0,1413,82~11680~1943512,00.html
_A - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 04:54 PM EST (#78964) #
Great article, thanks Mike.

"I'd like to get Paul out of our division," Beane said. "He'll also be a working partner for me. I'm telling you, if he goes there, you will see a lot of L.A.-Oakland trades."

Beane oughtta be careful, almost sounds like collusion :-)
robertdudek - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 04:59 PM EST (#78965) #
At the bototm of the referenced article, there's an annoucement to the effect that Oakland's payroll will increase to 60 million. Let's hear no more talk of it being a low-budget club - that will be near the median payroll this year.
Mike Green - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 05:16 PM EST (#78966) #
It's interesting for the home team that the A's payroll will increase to $60 million this year. Will the Jays follow suit in 2005, if necessary?
_Gwyn - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 05:18 PM EST (#78967) #
Not only near the median payroll but also on a very fast upward climb:

2001 - 33,810,750
2002 - 39,679,746
2003 - 50,360,833
2004 - 60,000,000
_Dean - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 05:22 PM EST (#78968) #
Could their payroll increase have anything to do with their top 3 starters?
Craig B - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 05:43 PM EST (#78969) #
Could their payroll increase have anything to do with their top 3 starters?

It's a fraction, yeah. The big three made $6.45 million combined last year; their collective raise of $5 million or so between 2001 and 2003 was about 30% of the $16.5 million jump between '01 and '03. All the young players together getting their standard year-by-year increases is the main factor, as the A's haven't exactly been making a splash in the FA market! But the Big Three are only a part of that - the Chavezes, Tejadas, and others are also a factor, as well as the back-end loading on longer-term deals.

The increased payroll likely has just as much to do with the fact that A's attendance has grown substantially since 2000. The A's ownership are probably quite happy to increase payroll so long as the team keeps winning.
_Chuck Van Den C - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 05:49 PM EST (#78970) #
"Actually, I'll wager it's probably someone who's already in the A's organization, an acolyte of DePodesta, who'll just be promoted"

Bingo!


So who from Baseball Prospectus becomes Forst's replacement?
_Gwyn - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 05:49 PM EST (#78971) #
Jermaine Dye is quite a factor too. The Big Three are still not earning that much, certainly going by their level of performance. Redman will earn more than any of them this year.
_NIck - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 05:51 PM EST (#78972) #
"At the bototm of the referenced article, there's an annoucement to the effect that Oakland's payroll will increase to 60 million. Let's hear no more talk of it being a low-budget club - that will be near the median payroll this year."

I'm not sure I agree. It seems in a great many instances a teams payroll is related strongly to it's place in the success cycle. Early in the success cycle when the homegrown players are cheap owner A is willing to spend x to pay for the homegrown players and cheap role players, while owner B is willing to spend x + y to pay for the homegrown players and y is used to pay for better role players or an impact FA. As the homegrown players become more expensive, x increases for both owners to pay for the homegrown players. Again, owner B puts up y to pay for a better supporting cast.

So, while, sure, 60 million might be around average for payroll, the A's homegrown players are getting expensive. Perhaps one could look at teams as high budget/low budget in terms of their place in the success cycle. How does a payroll of $60 million compare to other teams in the same location in the success cycle? Say, Boston, San Diego, San Fransisco, Seattle, and New York.

My point is is that despite an average payroll, Beane still has to be more efficient than other GMs with the same payroll, since his competition - those in the same place in the success cycle - still have y to spend which he doesn't.
_NDG - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 05:56 PM EST (#78973) #
I also wonder how long Nomo and Ishii will be around - their high walk rates are exactly what you don't want in a park like that.

While I feel nervous to challenge Mr. Dudek, I don't understand why that would be. I would think in a ballpark that suppresses scoring as much as Dodger Stadium, walks wouldn't hurt you nearly as much as extra-base hits would. Looking at Nomo's career stats seems to confirm this (as all his best years have been in LA despite high walk rates while there). Unless your just talking about finding pitchers that give up less walks and a similar number of hits, in which case you are just talking about finding better pitchers irregardless of ballpark.
Mike Green - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 05:58 PM EST (#78974) #
I'm no expert on market size, but I would have thought Minnesota would be a better comparison point for Oakland than Boston or New York.
Craig B - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 06:00 PM EST (#78975) #
NDG, I think it's related more to the fact that in Dodger, those extra-base hits are harder to come by. Letting the opposition put the ball into play is a better idea at Dodger Stadium than pretty much anywhere else.

But I can't speak for Robert, he may have something else in mind.
_NDG - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 06:03 PM EST (#78976) #
There is some advantage to playing for depth rather than ceiling for a mid-market team.

I disagree completely. The mid-market teams can afford to sign the $1-$2 million average players required to plug holes (much like the Jays have done with their bullpen). What they can't afford is the $8 million and up superstars, hence they need to get superstar production out of few cheap pre-FA players. If none of your players can produce at that level, there isn't any chance at winning.
Mike Green - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 06:06 PM EST (#78977) #
I think Robert's point about high walk rates in Dodger Stadium is that there is a lower batting average on balls in play than in other parks. It's a good park for the Cory Lidles (and Paul Quantrills) of the world, who generally throw strikes and keep the ball in the park, because it's much harder to string together three singles in LA than elsewhere.
_NIck - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 06:07 PM EST (#78978) #
"I'm no expert on market size, but I would have thought Minnesota would be a better comparison point for Oakland than Boston or New York."

I'm comparing the teams, not in terms of market size, but place in the success cycle. I'd definately include Minnesota along Boston, New York, etc.
_NDG - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 06:26 PM EST (#78979) #
those extra-base hits are harder to come by. Letting the opposition put the ball into play is a better idea at Dodger Stadium than pretty much anywhere else.

and

in Dodger Stadium is that there is a lower batting average on balls in play than in other parks. It's a good park for the Cory Lidles (and Paul Quantrills) of the world, who generally throw strikes and keep the ball in the park,

Funny enough, that's my point too. The lower the run-scoring environment, the lower the value of a walk (since walks can only advance batters/runners a maximum of one base). Since Nomo can prevent hits at a much better ratio than the average pitcher such as Cory Lidle. At Dodger Stadium he becomes unhittable, and the walks don't matter. In essence, the marginal value of a hit in Dodger Stadium is much higher than it is in a hitter's park. The ability to prevent hits therefore is in increased in significance, while the ability to prevent walks is devalued.
Coach - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 06:37 PM EST (#78980) #
Wow, this is a busy place today. I asked J.P. yesterday if DePodesta going to L.A. would be a good thing for the Jays, and he said it would be a great thing.

"Paul is good for the game, he's very bright. This just goes to show you that there's a lot more clubs paying attention to some things that are going on."

Ricciardi doesn't think there will come a day when so many teams have similar philosophies to his own that there's a point of diminishing returns. "There's thirty owners, with thirty different viewpoints of what they want to do. You'll never see a situation when they all think alike."

He's happy for Paul, and assured me that David Forst will be a capable replacement. I'm stealing from my own exclusive here, but it seemed relevant, so consider this a preview. Don't worry, I won't give everything away before Monday.
Gitz - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 06:44 PM EST (#78981) #
Jordan, I'm no more qualified to comment on the A's situation than anyone else here (except Moffatt), but thanks! This won't stop me from rambling, though ...

Maybe, like closers, GMs are fungible, and that maybe the A's should have let Beane, who is more expensive and controversial, walk, while retaining DePodesta, who is cheaper and seemingly more humble. It is terrific how many GMs the Beane team has produced, and, considering that J.P. is off to a good start in Toronto, there's no reason to think that Fuson and DePodesta won't succeed in their new roles. The one thing I wish would happen is if somebody in the Beane/Epstein mold would take over the Tigers, or another club who is, we assume, at the nadir, or at least very close to it. As Robert points out, the A's are no longer a low-budget team, and they were never really a "small-market club" in the sense that the Bay Area is the fourth biggest market in the U.S. Boston slants Epstein's success somewhat, because anybody can identify that Scott Williamson or Byung-Hyun Kim or Keith Foulke will help a bullpen but not everybody has the cash to go out and get those players. (Obligatory Kenny Williams jab: almost everybody realizes Keith Foulke's value.) Now that DePodesta has deep pockets to work with, it will be harder to gauge which is more important and which has a bigger impact, the new system or the increased cash. History in all venues points to money, but teams can spend money stupidly, as indeed the team that DePodesta is taking over has illustrated (Darren Dreifort, anyone?).

It's worth noting how the spread of the A's methodology compares to other sports. The analogy that comes immediately to mind is what happened in the NFL in the 1980s, when another so-called genius -- Bill Walsh -- changed the way people think about the game, in particular from the offensive side. Similarly, the rise in the 49ers organisation concurred with Joe Montana entering the scene, so that the club's success with the "West coast offense" became entangled with the unique ability of Montana (and, later, Jerry Rice). It's the standard chicken/egg approach. One wonders if the same results would have been attained with, say, Guy Benjamin at the fold. (Similarly, the A's rise has coincided with the development of three good pitchers, plus a few other holdovers from the Alderson regime, such as Jason Giambi, Miguel Tejada, and Eric Chavez.)

And so, predictably, after the 49ers won four Super Bowls over an eight-year span, the 49ers Spinoff Show took to the NFL, whose teams began looking not only at the 49ers system but also at the coaches who ran the show. I won't get into details, because not everyone would be familiar with the specific names, but it was assumed that the new coaches would bring with them the 49ers system, and regardless of who was on the team at the time -- or who the coach was even, in the NFL version of the author being dead; this time it was the coach who was dead -- success and championships would follow.

Except a funny thing happened: success and championships didn't follow. The West Coast offense certainly became the rage, but even the 49ers have only won one Super Bowl since the Montana years, which is nothing to be ashamed of, because it's more than, say, the Dolphins have won. But that title, in 1995, was bought; mercenaries like Ken Norton, Jr. and Deion Sanders were brought in. In addition, the Chargers were a typical (at the time) AFC patsy, but that's not the 49ers fault (any more than it was the Rockets fault in the NBA that Michael Jordan "retired," opening the door for their back-to-back titles in the mid-1990s). Eventually, the Packers, with coach Mike Holmgren, a disciple of Walsh, won a Super Bowl, but it was also with a world-class QB, Brett Favre. To wit: Holmgren is running the exact system in Seattle that he ran in Green Bay, except so far the Seahawks have been, at best, mediocre. Other teams -- again, I won't dive into specifics for fear of further alienation -- have adopted the West Coast offense but have found its results mixed. And that is a limitation to relying on systems in general: even the best system in the world is useless if you can't get the personnel in there. Well, duh, of course you can't win without good players; that's obvious. But the point is that you can't just win with a system. You have got to get people in there who not only know how to run it from the management side, but also the on-the-field talent has to be there, too. You can't just say to QB Joe Bloggs, "Get in there and throw safe, short, dump-off passes!" Much of that is luck -- who knew that a third-round draft pick from Notre Dame would be so good, or that a wider receiver from a small southern college would be the greatest in the history of the NFL? One can always say that Walsh was a genius: he knew what he had in Montana and Rice. One can always say that the author is dead, but that doesn't make it so.

None of this is to take anything away from Walsh and the system, or from what the A's have initiated now. What the 49ers did in the 1980s changed the NFL in the 1990s. If the same is indeed happening in MLB, and it looks that way when two "mainstream" teams like the Dodgers and Red Sox have jumped on board, it's important to remember that success is more than just saying, "Let's get hitters who walk and hit homers and pitchers who strike out lots of people, and let's run a draft by going after players that don't fit traditional molds, like fat catchers who can't play defense, and let's stick to mainly college players while minimizing our use of high-school players." That is a deliberate overstatement; nobody seriously believes it's that cut-and-dry. But on the other hand, that the A's success is entirely due to Beane or a driving philosophy is not true either. It is, like anything else, a mixture, but I am plainly situated on the side of "It's more important to find, either by luck or by skill, the players, than it is to have a system." You can have all the walkers and bashers and whiff artists and less-risky college players in the world, but that doesn't mean anything if there's not that -- duck, everyone -- intangible quality that separates the Jeremy Giambis from the Jason Giambis, the Joe Montanas from the Ryan Leafs, etc. How does one identify those qualities? You got me. But they are important, and I know that J.P., who was a scout, knows this. I am less sure of DePodesta, however, and one would like to think that Beane's success is due in no small part to the balance of talent he had at his side: DePodesta, the number cruncher; Ricciardi, the baseball guy; and Fuson, the combination of the two. But I maintain that the best things Beane has going for him is Mark Mulder, Tim Hudson, and Barry Zito, just like the best thing Bill Walsh had going for him was Joe Montana, Jerry Rice, and Ronnie Lott. I pointed out before that the A's run started with players that had been brought in by Sandy Alderson, so until the A's and their recent draft classes arrive in short order and continue what Alderson started, I think it's premature to conclude that the A's model will be an unqualified success. And at any rate, it will probably not be in Oakland, because by all accounts the famous 2002 draft is not going well so far, and the A's need those players to produce. And soon. The proof, if it can be called that, will come when Toronto wins, because J.P. took over a situation that was worse than Beane's. But at least it was better than Detroit or Milwaukee, because the Jays have Carlos Delgado and Roy Halladay and Vernon Wells and Josh Phelps. That's a good place to start.

I'll conclude this rant by commenting that it took a decade of 49ers dominance for the rest of the NFL to catch on. It's taking less than that in MLB -- Beane has only been around for seven years -- and, what is even more interesting, the A's have not won a World Series, or even an AL pennant. Probably that is neither here nor there, but you can imagine that if the 49ers had not won a Super Bowl in the 1980s, the words "West coast offense" would not have become the cliche that they did.
robertdudek - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 06:45 PM EST (#78982) #
Craig B and Mike Green have read my thoughts more or less correctly. Where long sequences are hard to come by (but homeruns are not), the best way to score runs would be walks and homeruns, which the fielders can do nothing about.

Ergo, pitchers who don't give up a lot of walks and homeruns is what you should be looking for. In parks in which it is difficult to get a homerun, but comparatively easy to get singles and doubles (as Busch Stadium used to be, or as the Metrodome sort of is now) there isn't quite the urgency of not walking guys. There you wouldn't mind a Nomo so much, a guy who can strike out tons of batters. Ishii, unless he improves, simply isn't a very good pitcher.

Interestingly, Oakland's park has similar effects to Dodgers Stadium and one of the pillars of Oakland's success has been pitchers who don't walk guys and who keep the ball on the ground.
Gitz - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 06:50 PM EST (#78983) #
Good grief, I need to learn to shut up, or start my own blog. Apologies, all.
_Young - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 06:51 PM EST (#78984) #
The mid-market teams can afford to sign the $1-$2 million average players required to plug holes (much like the Jays have done with their bullpen). What they can't afford is the $8 million and up superstars, hence they need to get superstar production out of few cheap pre-FA players.

I think all teams are looking for superstar production, ala Alfonso Soriano, from pre-FA players. But having expensive superstar players can't possibly be a hamper to a team. It all depends on who this player is, if he is a true superstar, say Bonds, Arod, Pujols, who provide great production, then spending upwards to "Arod type money" can still be good.

Lets not debate about the Arod situation though, his team is not competing not because of his contract. Nice, double negatives... ;)
robertdudek - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 06:56 PM EST (#78985) #
NDG,

I don't think you've quite got it. A high strikeout pitcher like Nomo will allow fewer hits, because of the strikeouts. But he's not necessarily going to allow fewer hits on balls in play. Because of his high K and W (not sure about the HR) he allows fewer balls in play as a percentage of batters faced than Lidle. Thus, the park will reduce both Nomo's and Lidle BIP AVG against but since Lidle gives up balls in play more frequently, the stadium ought to help him more.

Of course Nomo is a better pitcher than Lidle, but the point is that Lidle would be helped more by Dodgers Stadium than Nomo is, because the park acts to reduce hits on balls in play (and Lidle has more of those).

In a lower scoring environment, there are (generally speaking) more close games. In close games in alow-scoring environemnt, one-run strategies make more sense. To use one-run strategies, you need baserunners. A walk gives the opponent a free baserunner and it's my understanding that Nomo is fairly easy to run on.

The Royals, who have one of the best hitters parks in baseball, ought to try to get strikeout pitchers.
Craig B - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 07:07 PM EST (#78986) #
the rise in the 49ers organisation concurred with Joe Montana entering the scene, so that the club's success with the "West coast offense" became entangled with the unique ability of Montana (and, later, Jerry Rice). It's the standard chicken/egg approach.

Huh? No it isn't. Joe Montana was a third-round pick with a questionable arm. Jerry Rice was a surprise pick at the bottom of the first round, because his speed wasn't up to snuff.

Montana and Rice - and Roger Craig as well - proved they could be (and were) great players, *because* they were given a system in which they could leverage their talents. To a Raiders/Chargers/Dolphins team, or a Redskins team, they would have been nearly useless. Montana didn't have enough zip on the ball 20 yards downfield, and Rice and Craig were great runners in the open field, but not speed burners. If you ran Jerry Rice on a post pattern 15 times, he'd never get open.

In another scheme, these guys would have been ordinary players, maybe even soon forgotten about, because their skill set didn't conform to what was required of them by other teams. With the Niners, they clicked. Roger Craig could catch passes as a first option, not as an afterthought. Jerry Rice could run routes designed to produce gains after the catch. Montana could throw eight-yard outs, instead of twenty-yard outs, and use his incredible skill at making rapid reads to explore four or five receiving options, instead of two.

I don't think it's a chicken-and-egg question, not really. Ultimately, all the success of the team is achieved by the players. BUT tplayers only have the chance of success when their talents are leveraged correctly. Avoiding the New York Rangers - Texas Rangers problem.
Craig B - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 07:08 PM EST (#78987) #
Sorry, Gitz, about my opening. My point is not quite that strong that I can just say "no it isn't". But I don't think it is.
_NDG - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 07:17 PM EST (#78988) #
Hope I'm not making myself out to be an idiot, but I'll keep going!

Thus, the park will reduce both Nomo's and Lidle BIP AVG against but since Lidle gives up balls in play more frequently, the stadium ought to help him more.

I agree that Lidle's BIP (and hence WHIP) will improve by a greater percentage but that's not my point. Since run scoring is not linearly derived from number of baserunners, there's a threshold below which run scoring becomes extremely difficult. Since Nomo gives up fewer hits than Lidle he's closer to that threshold.

Put it this way, if Pitcher X were good enough to prevent any hits at all, he could conceivably give up 27 walks per game and not be scored against. This is obviously not realistic but it displays what I am talking about. The lower the $H%, the less values walks have. Again I'm not talking about preventing hits on balls in play, just preventing hits.

In each of your counters, you've mentioned homeruns. Your original statement (and what I'm arguing about) only mentions walks. Obviously a pitcher that gives up a lot of homeruns and walks is going to be bad, as this pitcher will have a far worse OPS against than the pitcher who you are comparing him to! Unless there is correlation between walk percentage and homerun percentage, I don't think that's the right comparison.
robertdudek - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 07:41 PM EST (#78989) #
Nomo isn't close to that threshold (he isn't that good). Hits and walks bunch due to various factors, among them random effects. That's the reason linear weights predicts run scoring well within the normal range of offence and defence. In any case, a great strikeout pitcher like Pedro is more valuable in a hitters park. Here is why.

Consider the difference between striking out a batter and allowing the batter to put the ball in play (let's forget about walks for a moment). A strikeout eliminates the possibility of a hit on a ball in play. The chances of getting an out in play are lower in a hitter's park, therefore the strikeout has more relative value. In a pitcher's park, the out in play is more likely, therefore the strikeout has less relative value.

Walks have a lower chance of scoring in a pitcher's park, but their value as a percentage of all offence is greater if singles and doubles are reduced (and homeruns are not). That's really what's important: It isn't the absolute value of the walk in Dodgers Stadium, but rather the relative value WRT other ways of producing runs.
_NDG - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 10:19 PM EST (#78990) #
I guess I'm assuming that the stadium depresses everything evenly. Where do you find walk, SO, and homerun properties of ballparks? What if the stadium reduced homeruns by a greater amount than singles and doubles? Which type of pitcher would benefit most then?

I find this really interesting because it's almost the opposite of most 'sabre-studies', as most advanced metrics try to make their evaluations context independant. What we are looking at here is how to most efficiently make use of the 'context' that actually must be played within.
robertdudek - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 11:02 PM EST (#78991) #
If every type of hit is reduced, the strikeout pitcher gains less that a ball in play guy.

You want strikeout guys in hitter's parks. Coors and perhaps a couple others reduce strikeouts per PA significantly, due to visibility and altitude factors. That complicates things. But in Hiram Bithorn, where almost all the extra offence is extra homeruns, you really need strikeout guys or, failing that, an extreme groundballer.

Batting element park factors can be found in the 2004 Bill James Handbook in the Park Indices section. I'm almost sure Dan Szymborski uses them for his ZiPS projections, though I'm not sure exactly how he applies them. Diamond Mind also provides their own on their season disks.

Every kind of projection system has to account for park if it is to be accurate. Each park has different effects on the various elements. It's important to regress the data to limit the potential error due to small sample sizes.

Context-neutral stats seek to estimate the "true" abilities of players, but that's a very different thing from figuring out who is helped and hurt relative to others by a given park.
Craig B - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 11:05 PM EST (#78992) #
Hits and walks bunch due to various factors, among them random effects.

Also due to lineup effects, which is big. A lot of runs (should) score in the 1-2-3-4-5 hitters. The 6-7-8-9 guys, not so much.
_R Billie - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 11:11 PM EST (#78993) #
Impact prospects will fetch more in a trade & their upside may mean greater reurn on the field if retained. Depth is essential and should not be looked down upon but drafting only average players make for average teams.

I don't think the idea is to draft "average" players but to draft players that do at least one or two important things well enough to be valuable for little money. For instance if Adam Peterson becomes an effective late inning reliever and David Bush becomes an effective third starter and Russ Adams becomes a capable middle infielder who can contribute offence, that's three positions you've filled from one draft, probably within three years of said draft.

Of course you can't win with ONLY these types of players but if you have the depth of these types of players you can afford to spend large chunks of your roster on star players (like $24 million between Halladay and Delgado in 2004) because you're spending relatively little on a productive supporting cast.

And of course in an ideal world you'll get a first round pick who is both "safe" and has All-Star type upside like Aaron Hill.
Gitz - Thursday, February 12 2004 @ 11:27 PM EST (#78994) #
Craig: explain, si vous plais, your comment to me. (Stupid English major here.)
Gitz - Friday, February 13 2004 @ 02:43 AM EST (#78995) #
Wait! I just got it, Craig, only three hours late. Too much coffee. Does that make you stupid? Or is that simply my birthright?

Anyway ... let me begin by saying that I HATE the 49ers as much as I love USC's college football team. There's no point in boring you with the reasons why, but having watched just about every 49er game in the Montana decade and beyond, I respectfully submit that Joe would have succeeded anywhere. His instincts were about the best I've ever seen in a QB, as you mention with his looking at four-five receivers while more than likely figuring out a way to tell the Russians why communism, Soviet-style, doesn't work. Plus, he had unbelievable touch on the deep ball and an uncanny way to thread defenders on the 20-yard pass that you reference. It's like watching hitters be late on Keith Foulke's 88 MPH fastball; you say, "How can he be late on that?!" With Montana it was "How can you not pick that off?" So it doesn't matter that he didn't have "zip"; Ryan Leaf had plenty of zip, but he also had zip for brains, so the arm strength was neutralized. And the 49ers weren't simply a dump-and-run team with Montana. Believe me, I lost count of the times I said, during a game, "How the F--- can you let Rice get that open downfield??!??!??" And, no, Rice is not fast, at least not as fast as other burners like Randy Moss or Raghib Ismael. But, honestly, he DID get open on posts, all the time, as I say above. You must have missed all those games with number 80 running past defensive backs on the way to a perfectly-thrown ball by Montana (and later Young)! It is astonishing how wide open he would be, and that wasn't just because John Taylor, his opposite number, was quite good in his way. Put Rice anywhere, any team, and he'll succeed.

The chicken/egg comment was not meant to imply that they did not benefit from the 'Niner way -- of course they did -- but to suggest that it's difficult to prove one way or another the effect of talent vs. system. But I know this much: Montana and Rice were special, and whether or not it's because Bill Walsh left Stanford to coach the 49ers is up for debate. What is not up for debate is that Joe and Jerry would have lit up scoreboards anywhere they played. They really were that good, and, I've never heard anyone in NFL circles suggest that they wouldn't have been that good on another team. With Montana I am less sure, but you don't score over 150 touchdowns, like Rice has/did because of a system.

I don't believe you have to observe every player in every game to get a feel for them -- "You don't know how good he is until you see him every day" -- but, seriously, I think I may know more about the 49ers than you do, Craig. I really believe that if you saw them every game you'd see it my way, because everybody else has. Just because everybody believes it does not make it so, of course, but I'm confident about this instance. This puts me ahead of you, knowledge-wise, in about two things, the other being ... wait, no, that's about it.

I can't believe it's come to this. I'm DEFENDING the 49ers and Montana -- and Rice! Ack!
Gitz - Friday, February 13 2004 @ 02:48 AM EST (#78996) #
Incidentally, Aaron Gleeman's latest post talks about the Walsh/Beane comparisons, and Aaron, unlike me, names some of the 49ers's assistant coaches who went on to become head coaches in the NFL. It's quite a list, but also a bit misleading, i.e. not all of those coaches -- Mike Shanahan, for instance -- ran a strict 49er-style offense. San Francisco used the pass to establish the run; with Denver it was the other way around. And I don't recall Gruden coaching with the 49ers, but that's quite possibly my bad. Anyway, as always, it's worth checking out Aaron's Web site.
_pete_the_donkey - Friday, February 13 2004 @ 08:26 AM EST (#78997) #
It's nice to see someone with the same last name doing well.
Congrats to Paul, from one DePodesta to another.
I'm still waiting for the day a DePodesta breaks into any of the 4 major sports...I'll be first in line for a jersey.
Craig B - Friday, February 13 2004 @ 09:18 AM EST (#78998) #
OK. My take... the Niners were my team, I watched them play every Sunday or Monday they were on, and they were on a lot. Loved that team.

You may know more than me. But the point I was making was this. Jerry Rice would not have played in the Don Shula setup. Neither would Joe Montana. There were dozens of guys better than them at running 20-yard sideline out patterns. Rice wasn't Mark Duper. He wasn't going to outleap guys all the time. But instead, their talents were suited for the system, and they flourished, and showed what they could do, and that you could do it differently.

Rice got open downfield, because the system was adaptable, flexible. He would get open downfield because he'd kill you on buttonhooks, curls, pops, end-arounds. Sooner or later you'd tell your corners to pull up to the line and hit him as hard as you can in the five-yard zone, and Rice would smile, fake outside, and run right by you. Rice wasn't slow, but he didn't get open with speed.

But it wasn't Steve Largent, either, dinks and dunks and ten yards a catch. (Disclaimer : Largent was one of my favourite players). Rice was a deep threat, not because he'd beat you on a fly pattern like the classic deep threat. He was a deep threat because he could run right along a seam in a zone defense, catch one of those unbelievable threaded balls (always on the move) with three men close by him, and shake ALL three guys and get into the open field. Largent would find the seam, turn, and catch the throw from Dave Krieg. But not on the move. And that's the thing that makes the true "West Coast" offense work. Well, that and a Joe Montana.

It's like the transition to the lively ball. It took Ruth (and his Yankees teammates, and Hornsby) to show that swinging hard from the end of the bat would *work* as a strategy. Would Ruth have been a great player in the deadball era? As a pitcher, sure. The admixture of talent and circumstance is what did the trick.
robertdudek - Friday, February 13 2004 @ 09:50 AM EST (#78999) #
Craig,

Perhaps if Shula had Montana and Rice on his roster he would have changed his system to accomodate them. It's hard for me to believe that an intelligent coach, having those two guys in practice, wouldn't have noticed what they could do. From there it's a small step to trying it out in a game.

It might have taken longer but eventually they'd get to play and show what they could do.
Pistol - Friday, February 13 2004 @ 10:04 AM EST (#79000) #
I'm fairly certain Gruden didn't coach with the 49ers. I believe he came from the Holmgren branch in GB and then to Philly before he became the Raiders head coach.
_MikeJ - Friday, February 13 2004 @ 01:34 PM EST (#79001) #
From the official site of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers:

"Gruden was an offensive assistant to head coach George Seifert with the San Francisco 49ers in 1990, working closely with offensive coordinator Mike Holmgren. The 49ers were an NFL-best 14-2, finally losing in the NFC Championship Game."
Gitz - Friday, February 13 2004 @ 07:50 PM EST (#79002) #
Thank you, Mike J. As I said, it was probably just my faulty memory, or else details like Gruden coaching had been lost in all my angst, formed because of the 5,000 times I heard Pat Summerall -- and my annoying mother, a die-hard 49er fan from the Keysar Stadium days -- say "Touchdown, 49ers!"

Anger. Gurgling. Must release in constructive way. (Politely smashes 14 windows.) Ahhhhhhh. All better now.
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